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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
No. 18-1047 
_____________ 
W. JAMES MAC NAUGHTON, 
 Appellant 
v. 
 
SHAI HARMELECH; CABLE AMERICA, INC., d/b/a Satellite America 
and USA Satellite & Cable, Inc.; USA SATELLITE & CABLE, INC. 
______________ 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(District Court No. 2-09-cv-05450) 
District Judge: Honorable Kevin McNulty 
______________ 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 9, 2020 
______________ 
Before: McKEE, AMBRO, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges. 
(Opinion filed: June 23, 2020) 
_______________________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________________ 
 
McKee, Circuit Judge 
 
 Attorney W. James Mac Naughton appeals the denial of his motion for pro se 
attorney’s fees. Mac Naughton argues that the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Segal v. Lynch, 48 A.3d 328 (N.J. 2012), does not prevent him from recovering such fees 
and non-taxable litigation costs because it does not apply retroactively. The District Court 
denied Mac Naughton’s motion in a well-reasoned Memorandum Opinion1 that adopted 
and supplemented the Magistrate Judge’s thorough Report and Recommendation.2 After a 
plenary review,3 we agree with the District Court’s assessment. Thus, for the reasons set 
forth in the Memorandum Opinion, as well as our independent assessment of Mac 
Naughton’s retroactivity argument, we will affirm.4   
The Segal Court held that pro se attorney-litigants cannot recover attorneys’ fees 
under a fee-shifting statute.5 However, the New Jersey Supreme Court did not specifically 
decide whether Segal applies retroactively or whether pro se attorney-litigants are barred 
from collecting contractually-based non-taxable costs. Mac Naughton raises these two 
points in his arguments on appeal.  He argues that Segal does not retroactively apply to his 
2009 contract for pro se attorney’s fees, or at least does not apply to the time he spent 
acting pro se before Segal.6 He also argues that Segal does not apply to his contractually-
 
1 A-3-7. 
2 A-8-18. 
3 Raab v. City of Ocean City, 833 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2016) (“We review a district 
court’s denial of attorney’s fees for abuse of discretion. . . . However, if the fee 
application was denied based on the district court’s conclusions on questions of law, our 
review is plenary.” (citation omitted)). 
4 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
5 Segal v. Lynch, 48 A.3d 328, 346–48 (N.J. 2012). 
6 Id. at 9. As Mac Naughton does not argue that Segal does not apply to contractually-
based attorney’s fees, we will not address that issue. See Appellant Br., 9. 
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based litigation costs.  Resolving these questions requires us to predict how the New Jersey 
Supreme Court would handle these issues.7 
New Jersey follows the traditional rule of “a presumption in favor of 
retrospectivity.”8 To determine whether a “new rule of law” should be applied retroactively 
or prospectively, New Jersey courts consider the following policy factors: “(1) the purpose 
of the rule and whether it would be furthered by a retroactive application, (2) the degree of 
reliance placed on the old rule by those who administered it, and (3) the effect a retroactive 
application would have on the administration of justice.”9 Applying these factors, we 
conclude Segal should be applied retroactively. 
First, Segal did not create a new rule of law, rather the Segal court reconciled a split: 
“The conflicting decisions found in our trial and appellate courts express a variety of policy 
considerations in support of or in opposition to permitting attorneys to be awarded counsel 
fees for representing themselves.”10 Second, the goals of Segal are served by retroactive 
application. All pro se litigants will be treated equally and thereby maintain public 
confidence in the judicial system.11 Third, retroactive application of Segal does not cause 
substantial inequitable results. As there was a split of authority on this issue, pro se 
 
7 Hunt v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 538 F.3d 217, 220–21 (3d Cir. 2008). 
8 Twp. of Stafford v. Stafford Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 711 A.2d 282, 287 (N.J. 
1998). See also In re Contest of Nov. 8, 2011 Gen. Election of Office of New Jersey Gen. 
Assembly, 40 A.3d 684, 707 (N.J. 2012). 
9 Twp. of Stafford, 711 A.2d at 287–88 (quoting State v. Knight, 678 A.2d 642, 651–52 
(N.J. 1996)). 
10 Segal, 48 A.3d at 346–48 (citing appellate and trial level decisions between 1994 and 
2011 that fluctuated between permitting or barring pro se attorney’s fees). 
11 Id. at 347-48. 
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attorney-litigants cannot reasonably argue their detrimental reliance on now overturned 
precedent. Moreover, as to Mac Naughton specifically, given that he argued for the 
application of Illinois law before the District Court, he cannot now argue that he 
detrimentally relied on pre-Segal case law when drafting the promissory agreement and 
litigating its enforcement.12  
Finally, as to Mac Naughton’s claim that Segal does not apply to his non-taxable 
litigation costs, we also find his argument does not have merit.  Similarly situated pro se 
litigants who are not attorneys would not be able to recover those fees or costs. Thus, 
Segal’s emphasis on not creating two classes of pro se litigants with different remedies 
bars Mac Naughton’s recovery.13 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s opinion and the pro 
se application for attorney’s fees and non-taxable costs is denied. 
 
12 See Appellant Br., 10, 14; see also A-12. 
13 Segal, 48 A.3d at 347 (quoting Gruber & Colabella, P.A. v. Erickson, 784 A.2d 758, 
761 (N.J. Super. Law. Div. 2001)) (“Most significantly, one court emphasized that ‘to 
hold otherwise would in effect create two separate classes of pro se litigants—those who 
are attorneys and those who are not—and grant different rights and remedies to each.’” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
